In this episode, we continue our discussion with Nathan B. Oman, the W. Taylor Reveley III Research Professor and Co-Director of the Center for the Study of Law and Markets at William & Mary School of Law. Nate specializes in Contract Law, the Economic Analysis of Law, Jurisprudence, Law and Religion, and Legal History. Today, we’re discussing his 2009 article, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth Amendment, published in the Minnesota Law Review.
As I mentioned in episode 1, the article first came to my attention this summer, when the internet erupted with suggestions that the specific performance clause in the Elon Musk (more precisely, X Holdings) merger agreement with Twitter wasn’t enforceable because of the 13th Amendment. As you heard in our last episode, Nate strongly disagrees with that take.
I’ve split my discussion with Nate into two parts. In Episode 1, largely driven by questions from UVA Law 3Ls Bridget Boyd and Jenn Scoler, we discussed the Musk-Twitter litigation and the various provisions of the merger agreement, including the specific performance provision and the termination fee. In this episode, we delve more deeply into Nate’s analysis of the scope of the 13th amendment’s prohibition against indentured servitude and its relation to the specific performance of personal service contracts. As always, we spend some time on examples from the world of sports . . . because hey, we’re in Virginia.
Links:
Nathan B. Oman faculty bio https://law2.wm.edu/faculty/bios/fulltime/nboman.php
Nathan B. Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth Amendment, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2020 (2009). https://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Oman_MLR.pdf
Amendment and Plan of Merger by and among X Holdings I, Inc., X Holdings II, Inc. and Twitter, Inc. dated as of April 25, 2022 https://kimberlydkrawiec.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Musk-Twitter-Agreement.pdf